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ABSTRACT
Deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples crafted by applying
human-imperceptible perturbations on benign inputs. However, under the black-
box setting, most existing adversaries often have a low transferability to attack
other defense models. In this work, from the perspective of regarding the adversar-
ial example generation as an optimization process, we propose two new methods
to improve the transferability of adversarial examples, namely Nesterov Iterative
Fast Gradient Sign Method (NI-FGSM) and Scale-Invariant attack Method (SIM).
NI-FGSM aims to adapt Nesterov accelerated gradient into the iterative attacks
so as to effectively look ahead and avoid the “missing” of the global maximum.
While SIM is based on our discovery on the scale-invariant property of deep learn-
ing models, for which we leverage to optimize the adversarial perturbations over
the scale copies of the input images so as to avoid “overfitting” on the white-
box model being attacked and generate more transferable adversarial examples.
NI-FGSM and SIM can be naturally integrated to build a robust gradient-based at-
tack to generate more transferable adversarial examples against the defense mod-
els. Empirical results on ImageNet dataset and NIPS 2017 adversarial competi-
tion demonstrate that our attack methods exhibit higher transferability and achieve
higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art gradient-based attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning models have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Szegedy et al., 2014), which are generated by applying human-imperceptible perturbations
on the benign input to result in misclassification. In addition, adversarial examples have an intrigu-
ing property of transferability in that adversarial examples crafted by the current model can also
fool other unknown models. As adversarial examples can help to identify the robustness of models
(Arnab et al., 2018), as well as improve the robustness of models by adversarial training (Goodfel-
low et al., 2014), learning how to generate robust adversarial examples with high transferability is
important and has gained increasing attentions in the literature.
Several gradient-based attacks have been proposed to generate adversarial examples, such as one-
step attacks (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and iterative attacks (Kurakin et al., 2016; Dong et al., 2018).
Under the white-box setting, with the knowledge of the current model, existing attacks can achieve
high success rates. However, they often exhibit low success rates under the black-box setting, espe-
cially for models with defense mechanism like adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017; Song et al.,
2019) and input modification (Liao et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018). Under the black-box setting, most
existing attacks fail to generate adversarial examples with great transferability.
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In this work, by regarding the adversarial example generation process as an optimization process, we
propose two new methods to improve the transferability of adversarial examples: Nesterov Iterative
Fast Gradient Sign Method (NI-FGSM) and Scale-Invariant attack Method (SIM).
• Inspired by the fact that Nesterov accelerated gradient (Nesterov, 1983) is superior to momentum
for conventionally optimization (Sutskever et al., 2013), we adapt Nesterov accelerated gradient
into the iterative gradient-based attack so as to effectively look ahead and avoid the “missing” of
the global maximum. We expect that NI-FGSM could replace the momentum iterative gradient-
based method (Dong et al., 2018) in the gradient accumulating portion and yield higher perfor-
mance.
• Besides, we discover that deep learning models have the scale-invariant property, and propose
a Scale-Invariant attack Method (SIM) to improve the transferability of adversarial examples by
optimizing the adversarial perturbations over the scale copies of the input images. SIM can avoid
“overfitting” on the white-box model being attacked and generate more transferable adversarial
examples to other black-box models.
• We found that combining our NI-FGSM and SIM with existing gradient-based attack methods
(e.g., diverse input method (Xie et al., 2019)) can further boost the attack success rates of adver-
sarial examples.
Extensive experiments on the ImageNet dataset (Russakovsky et al., 2015) show that our methods
attack both normally trained models and adversarially trained models with higher attack success
rates than existing baseline attacks. Our best attack method, SI-NI-TI-DIM (Scale-Invariant Nes-
terov Iterative FGSM integrated with translation-invariant diverse input method), reaches an average
success rate of 93.5% against adversarial trained models under the black-box setting. For further
demonstration, we evaluate our methods by attacking the top-3 defense solutions from NIPS 2017
adversarial competition (Kurakin et al., 2018). The results show that our attack method can gener-
ate adversarial examples with higher transferability than the top-1 attack solution of the NIPS2017
adversarial competition and the current strongest attacks.
2 PRELIMINARY
2.1 NOTATION
Let x and ytrue be a benign image and the corresponding true label, respectively. Let J(x, ytrue) be
the loss function of the classifier (e.g. the cross-entropy loss). Let xadv be the adversarial example
of the benign image x. The goal of the non-targeted adversaries is to search an adversarial example
xadv to maximize the loss J(xadv, ytrue) in the `p norm bounded perturbations. To align with
previous works, we focus on p = ∞ in this work to measure the distortion between xadv and x.
That is
∥∥xadv − x∥∥∞ ≤ , where  is the magnitude of adversarial perturbations.
2.2 ATTACK METHODS
Here we introduce several advanced gradient-based methods for generating adversarial examples.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014) generates an adversarial
example xadv by maximizing the loss function J(xadv, ytrue) with one-step update as:
xadv = x+  · sign(∇xJ(x, ytrue)), (1)
where sign(·) function restricts the perturbation in the L∞ norm bound.
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM). Kurakin et al. (2016) extend FGSM to an iterative
version by applying FGSM in iterations with a small step size α:
x0 = x,
xadvt+1 = Clip

x{xadvt + α · sign(∇xJ(xadvt , ytrue))},
(2)
where Clipx(·) function restricts the generated adversarial examples xadvt to be within the -ball of
x.
2
Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (MI-FGSM). Dong et al. (2018) integrate mo-
mentum into the iterative attack and lead to higher transferability of adversarial examples. Their
update procedure is formalized as follows:
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xJ(x
adv
t , y
true)∥∥∇xJ(xadvt , ytrue)∥∥1 ,
xadvt+1 = Clip

x{xadvt + α · sign(gt+1)},
(3)
where gt is the accumulated gradient at iteration t, and µ is the decay factor of gt.
Diverse Input Method (DIM). Xie et al. (2019) optimize the adversarial perturbations over the
diverse transformation of the input image at each iteration. The transformations include the random
resizing and the random padding. DIM can be naturally integrated into other gradient-based attacks
to further improve the transferability of adversarial examples.
Translation-Invariant Method (TIM). Instead of optimizing the adversarial perturbations on a sin-
gle image, Dong et al. (2019) use a set of translated images to optimize the adversarial perturbations.
They further develop an efficient algorithm to calculate the gradients by convolving the gradient at
untranslated images with a kernel matrix. TIM can also be naturally integrated with other gradient-
based attack methods. TI-DIM, the combination of TIM and DIM, is the current strongest black-box
attack methods.
2.3 DEFENSE METHODS
Various defense methods have been proposed to against adversarial examples, which can fall into
the following two categories.
Adversarial training. One popular defense method is adversarial training (Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Szegedy et al., 2014), which augments the training data by the adversarial examples during
the training process. Tramr et al. (2018) propose ensemble adversarial training by augmenting the
training data with perturbations transferred from various models to further improve the robustness
against the black-box attacks.
Input modification. The second category of defense methods aims to mitigate the effects of adver-
sarial perturbations by modifying the input data. Guo et al. (2018) discover that there exists a range
of image transformations that have the potential to remove adversarial perturbations while preserv-
ing the visual information of the images. Xie et al. (2018) mitigate the adversarial effects through
random transformations. Liao et al. (2018) propose high-level representation guided denoiser to
purify the adversarial examples.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 MOTIVATION
Similar with the process of training deep neural networks, the process of generating adversarial
examples can also be viewed as an optimization problem. In the optimizing phase, the white-box
model being attacked to optimize the adversarial examples can be viewed as the training data on
the training process. And the adversarial examples can be viewed as the training parameters of the
model. Then in the testing phase, the black-box models to evaluate the adversarial examples can be
viewed as the testing data of the model.
From the perspective of the optimization, the transferability of the adversarial examples is similar
with the generalization ability of the training model. Thus, we can migrate the methods used to
improve the generalization of models to the generating of adversarial examples, so as to improving
the transferability of adversarial examples.
Many methods have been proposed to improve the generalization ability of the deep learning mod-
els, which can be split to two aspects: (1) better optimization algorithm, such as Adam opti-
mizer(Kingma & Ba, 2014); (2) data augmentation (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014). Correspond-
ingly, methods to improve the transferability of adversarial examples can also be split to two aspects:
(1) better optimization algorithm, such as MI-FGSM that applies the idea of momentum; (2) model
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augmentation (i.e., ensemble attack on multiple models), such as the work of Dong et al. (2018) that
considers to attack multiple models simultaneously. Based on above analysis, we aim to improve
the transferability of adversarial examples by applying the idea of Nesterov accelerated gradient for
optimization and using a set of scaled images to achieve model augmentation.
3.2 NESTEROV ITERATIVE FAST GRADIENT SIGN METHOD
Nesterov Accelerated Gradient (NAG) (Nesterov, 1983) is a slight variation of normal gradient
descent that can speed up the training and improve convergence significantly. NAG can be viewed
as an improved momentum method, which can be expressed as:
vt+1 = µ · vt +∇θtJ(θt − α · µ · vt),
θt+1 = θt − α · vt+1. (4)
Compared to momentum (Polyak, 1964), the anticipatory update of NAG can prevent from going
too fast and lead to the increased responsiveness, so as to avoid the “missing” of the global max-
imum. Therefore, NAG is expected to have better performance than momentum. Sutskever et al.
(2013) provide empirical evidence that NAG is superior to momentum for conventionally difficult
optimization problems.
We naturally integrate NAG into the iterative gradient-based attack to build a robust adversarial
attack, which we refer to as NI-FGSM (Nesterov Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method). Specifically,
we make a jump in the direction of previous accumulated gradients before computing the gradients
in each iteration. Start with g0 = 0, the update procedure of NI-FGSM can be formalized as follows:
xnest = x
adv
t + α · µ · gt, (5)
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xJ(x
nes
t , y
true)
‖∇xJ(xnest , ytrue)‖1
, (6)
xadvt+1 = Clip

x{xadvt + α · sign(gt+1)}, (7)
where gt denotes the accumulated gradients at iteration t, and µ denotes the decay factor of gt.
3.3 SCALE-INVARIANT ATTACK METHOD
Other than considering a better optimization algorithm for the adversaries, we can also improve the
transferability of adversarial examples by model augmentation. We first introduce a formal definition
of loss-preserving transformation and model augmentation as follows.
Definition 1 Loss-preserving Transformation. Given an input x with its ground-truth label ytrue
and a classifier f(x) : x ∈ X → y ∈ Y with the cross-entropy loss J(x, y), if there exists an input
transformation T (·) that satisfies J(T (x), ytrue) ≈ J(x, ytrue) for any x ∈ X , we say T (·) is a
loss-preserving transformation.
Definition 2 Model Augmentation. Given an input x with its ground-truth label ytrue and a model
f(x) : x ∈ X → y ∈ Y with the cross-entropy loss J(x, y), if there exists a loss-preserving
transformation T (·), then we derive a new model by f ′(x) = f(T (x)) from the original model f .
we define such derivation of models as model augmentation.
Intuitively, similar to the generalization of models that can be improved by feeding more training
data, the transferability of adversarial examples can be improved by attack more models simultane-
ously. Dong et al. (2018) enhance the gradient-based attack by attacking an ensemble of models.
However, their approach requires training a set of different models to attack, which has a large com-
putational cost. Instead, in this work, we derive an ensemble of models from the original model by
model augmentation, which is a simple way of obtaining multiple models via the loss-preserving
transformation.
To get the loss-preserving transformation, we discover that deep neural networks may have the
scale-invariant property, besides the translation invariance. Specifically, the loss values are similar
for the original and the scaled images on the same model, which is empirically validated in Section
4
4.2. Thus, the scale transformation can be served as a model augmentation method. Driven by the
above analysis, we propose a Scale-Invariant attack Method (SIM), which optimizes the adversarial
perturbations over the scale copies of the input image:
argmax
xadv
1
m
m∑
i=0
J(Si(x
adv), ytrue),
s.t.
∥∥xadv − x∥∥∞ ≤ ,
(8)
where Si(x) = x/2i, which denotes the scale copy of the input image x with the scale factor
1/2i and m denotes the number of the scale copies. With SIM, instead of training a set of models
to attack, we can effectively achieve ensemble attacks on multiple models by model augmentation.
More importantly, it can help avoid “overfitting” on the white-box model being attacked and generate
more transferable adversarial examples.
3.4 ATTACK ALGORITHM
For the gradient processing of crafting adversarial examples, NI-FGSM introduce a better opti-
mization algorithm to stabilize and correct the update directions at each iteration. For the ensemble
attack of crafting adversarial examples, SIM introduces model augmentation to derive multiple mod-
els to attack from a single model. Thus, NI-FGSM and SIM can be naturally combined to build a
stronger attack, which we refer to SI-NI-FGSM (Scale-Invariant Nesterov Iterative Fast Gradient
Sign Method). The algorithm of SI-NI-FGSM attack is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 SI-NI-FGSM
Input: A clean example x with ground-truth label ytrue; a classifier f with loss function J ;
Input: Perturbation size ; maximum iterations T ; number of scale copies m and decay factor µ.
Output: An adversarial example xadv
1: α = /T
2: g0 = 0;xadv0 = x
3: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
4: g = 0
5: Get xnest by Eq.(5) . make a jump in the direction of previous accumulated gradients
6: for i = 0 to m− 1 do . sum the gradients over the scale copies of the input image
7: Get the gradients by∇xJ(Si(xnest ), ytrue)
8: Sum the gradients as g = g +∇xJ(Si(xnest ), ytrue)
9: Get average gradients as g = 1m · g
10: Update gt+1 by gt+1 = µ · gt + g‖g‖1
11: Update xadvt+1 by Eq.(7)
12: return xadv = xadvT
In addition, SI-NI-FGSM can be integrated with DIM (Diverse Input Method), TIM (Translation-
Invariant Method) and TI-DIM (Translation-Invariant with Diverse Input Method) as SI-NI-DIM, SI-
NI-TIM and SI-NI-TI-DIM, respectively, to further boost the transferability of adversarial examples.
The detail algorithms for these attack methods are provided in Appendix A.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide experimental evidence on the advantage of the proposed methods. We
first provide the setting of the experiments in Section 4.1. Then we explore the scale-invariant
property of deep learning model in Section 4.2. Then we perform ablation studies on our method
and compare it with MI-FGSM. Finally, we show that our method can be integrated with the current
attacks to boost the average attack success rate under single-model and multi-model settings.
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4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Dataset. We randomly choose 1000 images belonging to the 1000 categories from the ILSVRC
2012 validation set, which are almost correctly classified by all the testing models.
Models. We consider seven different models. Four of them are normally trained models, Inception-
v3 (Inc-v3) (Szegedy et al., 2016), Inception-v4 (Inc-v4), Inception-Resnet-v2 (IncRes-v2) (Szegedy
et al., 2017), and Resnet-v2-101 (Res-101) (He et al., 2016). The others are adversarially trained
models, Inc-v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4, and IncRes-v2ens (Tramr et al., 2018).
Baselines. We first validate the impact of each component of SI-NI-FGSM by comparing with MI-
FGSM (Dong et al., 2018). Then we integrate SI-NI-FGSM with DIM (Xie et al., 2019), TIM, and
TI-DIM (Dong et al., 2019), to further show the effectiveness of SI-NI-FGSM. We denote the attacks
combined with our SI-NI-FGSM as SI-NI-DIM, SI-NI-TIM, and SI-NI-TIM-DIM, respectively.
Hyper-parameters. For the hyper-parameters, we follow the settings in (Dong et al., 2018) with the
maximum perturbation as  = 16, the number of iteration as T = 16, and the step size as α = 1.6.
For MI-FGSM, we adopt the default decay factor µ = 1.0. For DIM, the transformation probability
is set to 0.5. For TIM, we adopt the Gaussian kernel and the size of the kernel is set to 7 × 7. For
SI-NI-FGSM, we set the number of the scale copies m as 5.
4.2 SCALE-INVARIANT PROPERTY
To validate the scale-invariant property of deep neural networks, we randomly choose 1,000 original
images from the ImageNet dataset and keep the scale size in the range of [0.1, 2.0] with a step
size 0.1. Then we feed the scaled images into the models, including Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-2, and
Res-101, to get the average loss value over 1,000 images.
As shown in Figure 1, we can easily observe that the loss curves are smooth and stable when the
scale size is in the range of [0.1, 1.3]. That is, the loss values would be very similar for the original
and scaled images. So we assume that the scale-invariant property is held within the range [0.1, 1.3].
In our attack, we leverage the scale-invariant property to optimize the adversarial perturbations over
the scale copies of the input images.
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Figure 1: The curves of average loss value for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2 and Res-101 given the
scaled images at each scale size. The results are averaged over 1000 images.
4.3 NI-FGSM VS MI-FGSM
We compare our NI-FGSM with the baseline attack MI-FGSM (Dong et al., 2018) and dissect the
impact of SIM by integrating SIM into NI-FGSM and MI-FGSM. As shown in Table 1, as com-
pared with MI-FGSM, NI-FGSM achieves higher attack success rate under the black-box setting.
The attack success rates of SI-NI-FGSM and SI-MI-FGSM against the defenses are improved by a
large margin, which we can directly attribute to SIM. Some adversarial examples generated by our
proposed SI-NI-FGSM are shown in Appendix B.
6
Table 1: The attack success rate (%) of adversarial attacks against the models. The adversarial
examples are crafted for Inc-v3 using MI-FGSM, NI-FGSM, SI-MI-FGSM, and SI-NI-FGSM, and
∗ indicates the white-box model being attacked.
Attack Inc-v3* Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Res-101 Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens Average
MI-FGSM 100.0 42.7 41.8 35.2 14.7 12.5 6.1 35.1
NI-FGSM(Ours) 100.0 52.6 51.4 41.0 12.9 12.8 6.4 39.6
SI-MI-FGSM(Ours) 100.0 69.1 67.0 63.1 32.0 31.0 17.2 54.2
SI-NI-FGSM(Ours) 100.0 76.0 73.3 67.6 31.6 30.0 17.4 56.6
4.4 ATTACK SINGLE MODEL
In this subsection, we extend our SI-NI-FGSM by combining with the baselines (TIM, DIM and TI-
DIM), and compare the black-box attack success rates of our extensions with the baselines under the
single model setting. As shown in Table 2, we observe that our extension methods consistently out-
perform the baseline attacks by 10% ∼ 35% under the black-box setting, and achieve nearly 100%
success rates under the white-box setting. It indicates that SI-NI-FGSM can serve as a powerful
approach to improve the transferability of adversarial examples.
Table 2: The attack success rates (%) of adversarial attacks against seven models under single-
model setting. The adversarial examples are crafted for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-101
respectively. * indicates the white-box attacks.
(a) Comparison of TIM and the extension SI-NI-TIM.
Model Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Res-101 Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens
Inc-v3 TIM 100.0* 47.8 42.8 39.5 24.0 21.4 12.9SI-NI-TIM (Ours) 100.0* 77.2 75.8 66.5 51.8 45.9 33.5
Inc-v4 TIM 58.5 99.6* 47.5 43.2 25.7 23.3 17.3SI-NI-TIM (Ours) 83.5 100.0* 76.6 68.9 57.8 54.3 42.9
IncRes-v2 TIM 62.0 56.2 97.5* 51.3 32.8 27.9 21.9SI-NI-TIM (Ours) 86.4 83.2 99.5* 77.2 66.1 60.2 57.1
Res-101 TIM 59.0 53.6 51.8 99.3* 36.8 32.2 23.5SI-NI-TIM (Ours) 78.3 74.1 73.0 99.8* 58.9 53.9 43.1
(b) Comparison of DIM and the extension SI-NI-DIM.
Model Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Res-101 Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens
Inc-v3 DIM 98.7* 67.7 62.9 54.0 20.5 18.4 9.7SI-NI-DIM (Ours) 99.6* 84.7 81.7 75.4 36.9 34.6 20.2
Inc-v4 DIM 70.7 98.0* 63.2 55.9 21.9 22.3 11.9SI-NI-DIM (Ours) 89.7 99.3* 84.5 78.5 47.6 45.0 28.9
IncRes-v2 DIM 69.1 63.9 93.6* 57.4 29.4 24.0 17.3SI-NI-DIM (Ours) 89.7 86.4 99.1* 81.2 55.0 48.2 38.1
Res-101 DIM 75.9 70.0 71.0 98.3* 36.0 32.4 19.3SI-NI-DIM (Ours) 88.7 84.2 84.4 99.3* 52.4 48.0 33.2
(c) Comparison of TI-DIM and the extension SI-NI-TI-DIM.
Model Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Res-101 Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens
Inc-v3 TI-DIM 98.5* 66.1 63.0 56.1 38.6 34.9 22.5SI-NI-TI-DIM (Ours) 99.6* 85.5 80.9 75.7 61.5 56.9 40.7
Inc-v4 TI-DIM 72.5 97.8* 63.4 54.5 38.1 35.2 25.3SI-NI-TI-DIM (Ours) 88.1 99.3* 83.7 77.0 65.0 63.1 49.4
IncRes-v2 TI-DIM 73.2 67.5 92.4* 61.3 46.4 40.2 35.8SI-NI-TI-DIM (Ours) 89.6 87.0 99.1* 83.9 74.0 67.9 63.7
Res-101 TI-DIM 74.9 69.8 70.5 98.7* 52.6 49.1 37.8SI-NI-TI-DIM (Ours) 86.4 82.6 84.6 99.0* 72.6 66.8 56.4
4.5 ATTACK ENSEMBLE OF MODELS
Following the work of (Liu et al., 2016), we would like to show the performance of our methods
when attacking multiple models simultaneously. Specifically, we attack an ensemble of normally
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trained models (including Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2 and Res-101) with equal ensemble weights
using TIM, SI-NI-TIM, DIM, SI-NI-DIM, TI-DIM and SI-NI-TI-DIM, respectively.
Table 3: The attack success rates (%) of adversarial attacks against seven models under multi-
model setting. * indicates the white-box models being attacked.
Attack Inc-v3* Inc-v4* IncRes-v2* Res-101* Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens
TIM 99.9 99.3 99.3 99.8 71.6 67.0 53.2
SI-NI-TIM (Ours) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.2 90.1 84.5
DIM 99.7 99.2 98.9 98.9 66.4 60.9 41.6
SI-NI-DIM (Ours) 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 88.2 85.1 69.7
TI-DIM 99.6 98.8 98.8 98.9 85.2 80.2 73.3
SI-NI-TI-DIM (Ours) 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 96.0 94.3 90.3
As shown in Table 3, our methods improve the attack success rates across all experiments over the
baselines. In general, our methods consistently outperform the baseline attacks by 10% ∼ 30%
under the black-box setting. In particular, SI-NI-TI-DIM, the extension by combining SI-NI-FGSM
and TI-DIM, can fool the adversarial trained models with an average success rate of 93.5%, which
indicates current adversarial trained models provide few benefits for the robustness when meeting
SI-NI-TI-DIM under the black-box setting.
4.6 COMPARISON ON NIPS 2017 ADVERSARIAL COMPETITION
We consider to quantify the effectiveness of our methods by evaluating on the top-3 defense solutions
from the NIPS 2017 adversarial competition, which are high-level representation guided denoiser
(HGD, rank-1) (Liao et al., 2018), input transformation though random resizing and padding (R&P,
rank-2) (Xie et al., 2018), and rank-3 submission (NIPS-r3)1.
We compare our SI-NI-TI-DIM with MI-FGSM (Dong et al., 2018), which is the top-1 attack so-
lution in the NIPS competition, and TI-DIM (Dong et al., 2019), which is state-of-the-art attack
method. We first generate adversarial examples for the ensemble models, including Inc-v3, Inc-v4,
IncRes-v2, and Res-101 by using MI-FGSM, TI-DIM, and SI-NI-TI-DIM, respectively. Then, we
evaluate the adversarial examples by attacking the top-3 defense solutions.
As shown in Table 4, our method SI-NI-TI-DIM achieves an average attack success rate of 93.9%,
which outperforms the state-of-the-art attack method by a large margin of 13.6%. The results show
that, only depending on the transferability of adversarial examples, SI-NI-TI-DIM can fool not only
the adversarial trained models but also other strong defense mechanism, raising new security issues
for the development of more robust deep learning models.
Table 4: The attack success rates (%) of adversarial attacks against top-3 defense solutions
from NIPS 2017 adversarial competition.
Attack HGD R&P NIPS-r3 Average
MI-FGSM 36.9 29.3 40.8 35.7
TI-DIM 84.8 75.3 80.7 80.3
SI-NI-TI-DIM (Ours) 96.1 91.3 94.4 93.9
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, by an analogy with the training of deep models, we regard the process of generating
adversarial examples as an optimization problem, where the current white-box model is the training
data, other black-box models are the testing data, and the generated examples are the parameters to
be trained. We wish the generated examples have a good transferability and design two methods for
a better optimization algorithm and data argumentation, respectively.
1https://github.com/anlthms/nips-2017/tree/master/mmd
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Specifically, we propose two new attack methods, NI-FGSM and SIM, to improve the transferabil-
ity of adversarial examples. NI-FGSM adopts the Nesterov accelerated gradient method into the
gradient-based attack, and SIM aims to achieve model augmentation by leverage the scale-invariant
property of models. NI-FGSM and SIM can be naturally combined to build a more robust attack
called SI-NI-FGSM. Moreover, by integrating SI-NI-FGSM with baseline attacks, we can further
improve the transferability of adversarial examples. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our
methods not only yield higher success rates on the adversarial trained models but also break other
strong defense mechanism with nearly 94% attack success rate. We believe our methods could serve
as a strong benchmark for evaluating the robustness of various defense models.
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A DETAILS OF THE ALGORITHMS
The algorithm of SI-NI-TI-DIM attack is summarized in Algorithm 2. We can get the SI-NI-DIM
attack algorithm by removing Step 10 of Algorithm 2, and get the SI-NI-TIM attack algorithm by
removing T (·; p) in Step 7 of Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 SI-NI-TI-DIM
Input: A clean example x with ground-truth label ytrue; a classifier f with loss function J ;
Input: Perturbation size ; maximum iterations T ; number of scale copies m and decay factor µ.
Output: An adversarial example xadv
1: α = /T
2: g0 = 0;xadv0 = x
3: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
4: g = 0
5: Get xnest by Eq.(5) . make a jump in the direction of previous accumulated gradients
6: for i = 0 to m− 1 do . sum the gradients over the scale copies of the input image
7: Get the gradients by∇xJ(T (Si(xnest ); p), ytrue) . apply random resizing and padding
to the inputs with the probability p
8: Sum the gradients as g = g +∇xJ(T (Si(xnest ); p), ytrue)
9: Get average gradients as g = 1m · g
10: Convolve the gradients by g =W ∗ g . convolve gradient with the pre-defined kernelW
11: Update gt+1 by gt+1 = µ · gt + g‖g‖1
12: Update xadvt+1 by Eq.(7)
13: return xadv = xadvT
B VISUALIZATION OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
We visualize 12 randomly selected benign images and their corresponding adversarial images in
Figure 2. The adversarial images are crafted for Inc-v3 using the proposed SI-NI-FGSM. We see
that these generated adversarial perturbations are human imperceptible.
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Figure 2: Visualization of randomly picked benign images and their corresponding adversarial im-
ages, crafted on Inc-v3 using SI-NI-FGSM.
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